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Directed by: W. Pitt Derryberry, Sam McFarland, Kathi Miner-Rubino 
Department of Psychology     Western Kentucky University 
 Recently in the psychological field, attitudes are being recognized as existing on 
the explicit and implicit level (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Aversive racists 
have been defined as people low in explicit prejudice but high in implicit prejudice (Son 
Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002). The purpose of this study was to determine what distinguishes 
those who are low in prejudice from aversive racists. Participants were compared on eight 
different constructs: authenticity, moral judgment development, moral identity, 
nonprejudice, social dominance, authoritarianism, empathy, and social desirability. No 
differences were found between low prejudice people and aversive racists. People high in 
explicit prejudice were found to differ from people low in explicit prejudice on 
authenticity, moral judgment development, moral identity, nonprejudice, social 
dominance, and authoritarianism.   
   1 
Introduction 
 Recently, the psychological field has experienced a shift in paradigms as attitudes 
have begun to be examined in not only a conscious manner but in an unconscious manner 
as well (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Attitudes are being recognized as 
existing on two levels: explicit and implicit. Explicit attitudes are attitudes that a person 
publicly and consciously endorses, while implicit attitudes present themselves as actions 
and judgments that are automatically activated without the person's awareness 
(Greenwald et al.). In many cases, the attitudes expressed on an explicit level and on an 
implicit level agree. For instance, in the case of insects, both implicit and explicit 
attitudes concur as people generally report a negative explicit view of insects and also 
display an implicit bias against insects (Greenwald et al.). Agreement between implicit 
and explicit attitudes is not always the case, though.  
 For example, in topics where there is a societal norm to respond in a certain 
manner, explicit and implicit attitudes can differ. For instance, Greenwald et al. (1998) 
demonstrated that a disagreement appeared between implicit and explicit attitudes on 
attitudes regarding racial or ethnic groups. On explicit measures, people tended to 
respond in an egalitarian fashion (i.e., no prejudice), while on implicit measures, those 
same people tended to respond in a manner favoring their in-group (Greenwald et al.). In 
this experiment, there was one exception (out of 26) to this finding; one participant had a 
positive implicit score and a positive explicit score (Greenwald et al.).  
 A natural conclusion one might come to regarding the dichotomy that is 
sometimes found between implicit and explicit attitudes is that they are not measuring the 
same construct. However, the findings of Asendorpf, Banse, and Mucke (2002) and
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Dambrun and Guimond (2004) suggest otherwise. Asendorpf et al. demonstrated a 
double dissociation (i.e., two similar but different behaviors are controlled by two 
different entities) in their study suggesting the two kinds of attitudes do in fact tap into 
the same construct. Participants completed an explicit self-rating measure of shyness and 
an Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) version modified to deal with 
shyness (Asendorpf et al.). The IAT is a well-known and widely used measure designed 
to illustrate a person’s implicit attitudes or associations of various constructs (i.e., gender, 
race, self-constructs, etc.). The IAT requires a person to categorize two objects along 
with positive and negative attributes. If a person responds quickly when an object is 
paired with positive (or negative) attributes, then it can be inferred that those two 
constructs (i.e., the object and the positive or negative attributes) are associated very 
closely together. If an object is closely associated with a negative attribute then it can 
further be inferred that the person holds a generally negative view of the object. 
Asendorpf et al. found that the explicit measure predicted a person’s controlled shy 
behavior, while the IAT predicted a person’s spontaneous shy behavior. This suggests 
that implicit and explicit measures are measuring the same construct because they predict 
the same behavior under different circumstances. Dambrun and Guimond (2004) 
manipulated relative gratification (i.e., people led to believe they are privileged, or in a 
gratified position), which is a process that increases explicit prejudicial attitudes, and 
found that implicit prejudicial attitudes also increased. Together, these findings indicate 
that implicit attitudes and explicit attitudes are part of the same constructs. 
According to Asendorpf et al. (2002), findings like these support the Motivation 
and Opportunity as Determinants (MODE) model of attitude-behavior relations (Fazio, 
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1990). MODE suggests that measures of implicit attitudes predict spontaneous or 
automatic behavior better than controlled behavior, while measures of explicit attitudes 
predict controlled behavior better than spontaneous or automatic behavior (Fazio & 
Towles-Schwenn, 1999). Related to and supportive of MODE is the behavior 
manifestation that can be witnessed in the aversive racism literature. Aversive racists are 
defined by Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) as people who consciously advocate egalitarian 
attitudes but subconsciously have negative feelings toward out-groups, particularly 
African-Americans. Aversive racists have also been categorized as people low in explicit 
prejudice (i.e., negative evaluations of out-groups that are consciously endorsed) but high 
in implicit prejudice (i.e., negative associations of out-groups that are unconscious; Son 
Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002). Aversive racists often perform behavior that is egalitarian 
when the situation is unambiguous, but when the situation is ambiguous, aversive racists 
often display biases (Gaertner & Dovidio). 
 An example will clarify this matter. Hodson, Dovidio, and Gaertner (2002) had 
European-American participants, who were divided into high and low prejudice scoring 
groups by responses on an explicit measure of prejudice, evaluate applications for 
admission to a university. When the situation was unambiguous (i.e., the applicant had 
either high aptitude and achievement scores or low aptitude and achievement scores) 
African-American and European-American applicants were accepted at the same rate by 
both high and low prejudiced groups. However, when the situation was ambiguous (i.e., 
the applicant had a high aptitude score and a low achievement score, or vice versa) bias 
was observed as European-Americans were accepted to the university at higher rates than 
African-Americans by the high prejudiced group.  
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 In a similar fashion, Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) demonstrated that while self-
reported prejudice has diminished in recent history, the level of bias in selection decisions 
has not decreased. Dovidio and Gaertner had participants complete a self-report measure 
of prejudice and make hiring decisions based on qualifications of job applicants. Two 
different groups of participants completed this study; one group participated in 1989, 
while the other group participated in 1999. The authors found that self-reported prejudice 
decreased across the 10 year span, but bias in hiring decisions in an ambiguous situation 
remained at a constant (Dovidio & Gaertner). This decrease in explicit prejudice, but 
consistency in implicit prejudice, may suggest that people are becoming more conscious 
of negative attitudes and what society advocates as correct. This trend of explicit 
prejudice decreasing with implicit prejudice remaining constant has been shown in other 
ways as well.  
For example, Baron and Banaji (2006) sought to understand the development of 
implicit prejudice. They gave six-year-olds, ten-year-olds, and adults, an explicit measure 
of prejudice and an implicit measure of prejudice. Baron and Banaji found that explicit 
prejudice was rather strong with the six-year-olds and steadily declined with the adults 
until the attitudes were seen as egalitarian. Implicit prejudice, on the other hand, was 
steady and did not change across the age groups (Baron & Banaji). With implicit attitudes 
being established at such an early age, one ponders if they are hard wired into the brain 
and are more of an internal structure rather than an external presence that can be changed 
like a habit. 
Purpose of the Current Study 
So far, the discussion has focused on differences between implicit and explicit 
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attitudes, and on aversive racism as a way to address the differences that can exist 
between these attitudes. While some findings (e.g., Baron & Banaji, 2006; Dovidio & 
Gaertner, 2000; Greenwald et al., 1998) may suggest that all people are implicitly 
prejudiced, the aversive racism literature has shown this is not the case. The question of 
interest where the current study is concerned is what aspects of an individual lead that 
person to be someone who is low prejudiced or is an aversive racist. There is limited 
research on this topic, and because of the behavioral implications of aversive racism (e.g., 
job selection) more research is needed. Before discussing the limited research, the various 
manners of operationally defining aversive racism should be highlighted.  
To date, aversive racism has been measured in a number of ways. Gaertner and 
Dovidio (1986) used a behavioral task that involved participants making a selection 
decision to determine aversive racism. Van Heil and Mervielde (2005) used a self-report 
scale to identify aversive racists. Son Hing, Li, and Zanna (2002) used an explicit and an 
implicit measure of prejudice to define aversive racism. The current study operationally 
defines an aversive racist as a person low in explicit prejudice but high in implicit 
prejudice (i.e., in the manner of Son Hing, et al.). Now the literature will be discussed. 
A literature search only produced two studies on the topic of characteristics of 
aversive racism. Silvestri and Richardson (2001) examined the relationship between the 
Big Five personality constructs and aversive racism, finding that the constructs of 
agreeableness, extraversion, and openness were negatively correlated with aversive 
racism. This suggests that aversive racists are more prone to skepticism and critical 
evaluation of others, and they are socially reserved and conventional (Silvestri & 
Richardson). Van Heil and Mervielde (2005) examined the connection of social 
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dominance orientation and authoritarianism to aversive racism. Social dominance and 
authoritarianism were found to differentiate between egalitarianism and aversive racism, 
indicating that aversive racists prefer inequality among social groups, submit to 
authorities, possess a general aggressiveness, and adhere to social conventions (Van Heil 
& Mervielde).    
While Silvestri and Richardson (2001) and Van Heil and Mervielde (2005) have 
noted some important relationships with aversive racism, there is still much ground left to 
uncover. This study will move away from examining the Big Five Personality factors in 
conjunction with aversive racism for a few reasons. The Big Five Personality factors are 
so broad and general that some aspect of the factors can be found to correlate with most 
other constructs. Also, given that these factors have been examined and a relationship has 
been established, the urgency to establish a connection no longer exists. There is a need 
to explore further the contributions of social dominance and authoritarianism in the 
tradition of Van Heil and Mervielde, however. This is because Van Heil and Mervielde 
used a different definition for aversive racism (i.e., as a reluctance to interact with 
members of an out-group) than what is used in the proposed study. Also, these two 
constructs are theoretically relevant to aversive racism.  
In examining contributions to aversive racism versus those to truly low prejudice, 
I propose that specific relationships will be seen on dimensions of authenticity, moral 
judgment development, moral identity, nonprejudice, social dominance, authoritarianism, 
empathy, and social desirability. Each of these constructs is reviewed below. With the 
exception of social dominance and authoritarianism, most of these constructs have not 
been examined in connection with aversive racism or with implicit attitudes. Thus, the 
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support given for each construct's relationship with aversive racism is largely inferential. 
Nonetheless, the theoretical nature of these constructs along with some of these 
constructs’ noted relationships with explicit prejudice suggest that they may pertain to the 
likelihood of aversive racism.   
Authenticity  
 Authenticity is defined as the unhindered operation of a person's true self in daily 
activities (Goldman & Kernis, 2002). Kernis and Goldman (2005) conceptualize 
authenticity as being comprised of four components: awareness, unbiased processing, 
behavior, and relational orientation. The awareness component deals with awareness of 
and trust in one's feelings and desires. Unbiased processing of information involves not 
denying or modifying private knowledge, internal experiences, or externally based 
evaluative information. The behavior component of authenticity involves people acting in 
agreement with their true selves. The relational orientation component deals with the 
amount to which a person values and achieves openness and truthfulness in the person’s 
close relationships. 
 If a person explicitly reports low prejudice and also scores high on an authenticity 
scale, then it would make logical sense that the person would further score low on an 
implicit measure of prejudice. An authentic person operates from his or her true self in an 
unobstructed manner (Kernis & Goldman, 2005). The highly authentic person’s implicit 
attitude should match his or her explicit attitude because the person authentically presents 
the person’s true self/feelings to the outside world. This does not mean that high 
authenticity scores would necessarily decrease the likelihood of aversive racism, though. 
For example, for a person with a truly authentic understanding of self, scores on an 
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explicit measure of prejudice should correspond with how he or she scores on the implicit 
measure whether the explicit measure of prejudice is positive or negative. If a person is 
low in authenticity, this person would present a false representation of him/herself to the 
world. This could translate into a person being labeled as an aversive racist, because the 
person has negative implicit attitudes, but does not willingly express these feelings and 
thus reports positive explicit attitudes.    
Moral Judgment Development 
 The neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral judgment development emphasizes 
cognition, personal construction of epistemological categories, and change over time in 
terms of development with a shift during young adulthood from conventional to 
postconventional moral thinking (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2000). The neo-
Kohlbergian approach defines moral judgment development as occurring in schemas 
rather than in hard stages. Schemas are general knowledge structures that exist in long-
term memory and facilitate information-processing (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 
1999). The neo-Kohlbergian approach devises three schema of moral judgment 
development that a person progressively develops through, beginning at the lower levels 
until reaching the highest level (although reaching the highest degree of schema 
development does not occur in every instance; Rest, et al., 1999). The first is the personal 
interest schema, followed by the maintaining norms schema, and finally the 
postconventional schema. 
 A person operating from the personal interest schema justifies a decision 
according to what is personally at stake for that person and what direct consequences 
accompany the action (Rest, et al., 1999). A person operating from the maintaining norms 
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schema justifies a decision according to the norms of society. A person operating from 
this schema realizes that laws need to be established which the entire society follows. A 
person operating from the postconventional schema realizes that moral obligations should 
be based on shared ideals that are reciprocal and open to debate. The postconventional 
thinker realizes that laws can be made in an arbitrary manner and do not necessarily mean 
that a person must follow the laws. This person accepts that laws can be biased.  
 Moral schemas are seen as operating on an implicit and tacit level (Narvaez & 
Bock, 2002). The Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest et al., 1999) is said to measure moral 
judgment development on a non-verbal and intuitive level (Narvaez & Bock). The DIT 
accomplishes this by measuring recognition knowledge rather than explicit knowledge 
(Rest et al., 1999). The manner in which the neo-Kohlbergians envision moral judgment 
development is an implicit cognitive process rather than an explicit cognitive process. 
When completing both the DIT and the IAT a person is required to recognize rather than 
articulate responses. Because both measures are tapping into an implicit process, they 
should reflect each other in certain ways. 
 People operating from the personal interest schema are more likely to be either 
explicitly prejudiced or aversive racist because they are self-focused and would not be 
implicitly or explicitly focused on treating others with justice and fairness. People 
operating from the maintaining norms schema generally feel pressure to conform to 
societal norms (Rest et al., 1999). Because they do conform, it is plausible that they 
would be likely to explicitly report an attitude favoring nonprejudice (i.e., an attitude 
approved by society) while having a different implicit attitude (i.e., like an aversive 
racist). People operating from the postconventional schema tend to be outside of the 
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pressure to conform to societal norms and are characterized by appealing to an ideal (Rest 
et al.). Rest et al. state that these ideals can include things like mandating fair treatment, 
actualizing personhood, and so forth. It seems plausible that people who make moral 
decisions that are driven from the postconventional schema should report low explicit 
prejudice as well as low implicit prejudice. It is possible that people operating at the 
maintaining norms schema could be aversive racists if their implicit attitude differs from 
their explicit attitude. 
 The relationship between moral reasoning and prejudice has been examined 
minimally, however. It is logical to suggest that a person operating from an advanced 
moral judgment developmental schema like the postconventional schema would be more 
concerned with treating all people as equals (i.e., appeals to an ideal). McFarland (in 
press) is the only study to be identified that has examined the relationship between moral 
reasoning and prejudice. McFarland demonstrated that postconventional moral reasoning 
was a negative predictor of generalized prejudice. McFarland’s finding deals with explicit 
attitudes and moral reasoning but not with implicit attitudes. This current study hopes to 
build upon McFarland's findings and supplement it by differentiating how moral 
reasoning affects implicit and explicit attitudes.   
Higher scores on the DIT have been linked to other constructs that should pertain 
to prejudice, as well. For example, Rest et al. (1999) reported that higher scores have 
been related to community involvement and civic responsibility. Derryberry and Thoma 
(2005) demonstrated that moral judgment development predicted self-reported altruism 
and attitudes regarding civil liberties. Given that higher moral judgment development 
scores have been linked to prosocial behaviors like these, it seems plausible that 
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developmentally more morally advanced people would also be concerned with treating 
others as equals. So, people that are advanced in moral judgment development (i.e., 
consistently operating from the postconventional schema) should score low on explicit 
and implicit measures of prejudice and therefore not be categorized as aversive racists.      
Moral Identity 
 Hart, Atkins, and Ford (1998) defined moral identity as a commitment to one’s 
understanding of self to behaviors that promote or protect the welfare of others. Blasi 
(1984) suggests that moral identity is a mechanism that motivates moral action. Blasi 
(1993) hypothesizes that moral understanding gives rise to moral action if one is deemed 
personally responsible, moral responsibility is the outcome of integrating morality in 
one’s identity, and moral identity drives one to make one’s actions consistent with one’s 
ideals. In a similar vein, Rest proposes a Four Component model of moral functioning 
(Narvaez & Rest, 1995). This model proposes that in order to produce moral behavior, 
four processes must be present. The four components are moral sensitivity, moral 
judgment, moral motivation, and implementation. Moral motivation suggests that a 
person gives priority to the moral value above all other values and intends to fulfill it. 
Both Rest and Blasi therefore agree that moral identity is important in performing moral 
behavior.   
Aquino and Reed (2002) examined the construct of moral identity as a connecting 
piece between moral reasoning and moral behavior and created a measure to assess moral 
identity. If a person is truly committed to being a moral person and engaging in moral 
behaviors, then treating all humans with equality should be a priority to this person. 
Aquino and Reed make the argument that moral identity is separate from moral reasoning 
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because reasoning deals with the cognitive aspect of knowing right from wrong, while 
identity deals with claiming moral traits as being essential to a person’s self-concept. 
Aquino and Reed envision moral identity as being comprised of two components: 
internalization and symbolization. Internalization deals with the self-importance of moral 
characteristics, while symbolization refers to engaging in public actions that demonstrate 
that a person values moral traits (i.e., volunteering at a homeless shelter). The 
internalization component may reflect implicit processing. If some construct(s), in this 
case moral traits, are internalized, then it would make sense that they would exist on an 
implicit level. Aquino and Reed also correlated scores on the moral identity measure with 
an IAT modified to deal with moral traits and the self. The IAT was correlated with the 
internalization dimension but not the symbolization dimension (Aquino & Reed).  
 Aquino and Reed (2002) further demonstrated that a person who identifies highly 
with moral traits also report greater amounts of volunteer behavior as opposed to 
someone who does not identify with moral traits. This last finding has some problems as 
both constructs, moral identity and volunteer behavior, were both determined by self-
reports; it could be possible that people are savvy to what a researcher is looking for and 
reporting in a like manner. To clear confusion, Aquino and Reed conducted a study 
where they found that moral identity significantly predicted actual donation behavior.  
 The connection between moral identity and donation behavior is extremely 
important. The experiment was set up in a way such that when the participants donated 
there was no way for the researcher to know who did or did not donate (at least the 
participants did not know of a way) (Aquino & Reed, 2002). This removes any social 
desirability factor and suggests that people that consider morality a strong part of their 
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self-concept will perform moral behavior when no reward is provided. This should play a 
factor into why a person would be implicitly prejudiced and explicitly egalitarian as 
opposed to both implicitly and explicitly egalitarian. If a person highly values and 
identifies with moral traits, then it makes sense that the person should also value equality 
and respect for various racial and ethnic groups on both implicit and explicit levels, 
leading that person to be implicitly and explicitly low in prejudice.  Reed and Aquino 
(2003) examined this notion by demonstrating that a person who scored high on the 
moral identity scale also viewed out-groups as the same as in-groups. People who 
considered moral identity to be a very important self-relevant construct of theirs also had 
more favorable attitudes toward relief efforts to aid out-groups (Reed & Aquino).  
 As noted previously, the argument that people high in moral identity are more 
likely to be implicitly and explicitly egalitarian has been made. In the other direction, 
people low in moral identity may be likely to be aversive racists because they are less 
likely to have internalized moral traits, like treating others in an unbiased manner. 
Because they have not internalized these traits, their explicit attitude is likely to differ 
from their implicit attitude. Further, because we live in a society where unbiased behavior 
is looked upon favorably, their explicit attitude will likely coincide with this, while their 
implicit attitude may not.    
Nonprejudice 
 A seemingly obvious construct that should predict if a person is truly low 
prejudiced or is an aversive racist is nonprejudice. Phillips and Ziller (1997) have defined 
nonprejudice as a universal orientation where similarities between the self and diverse 
others are emphasized. Phillips and Ziller suggest that this perceived similarity is a 
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fundamental link to a number of positive outcomes including helping, understanding, and 
reduced prejudice. The authors further demonstrated that participants who scored high on 
the Universal Orientation Scale (UOS; Phillips & Ziller), a measure of nonprejudice, 
were as accepting of minority members as they were of nonminority members. 
Participants scoring low on the UOS were also as accepting of minority members as high 
scoring UOS participants, but high scoring UOS participants further rated the minority 
members as equally attractive, similar, and desirable, while the low scoring UOS 
participants did not (Phillips & Ziller). Given findings such as these, people who identify 
themselves as having a universal orientation towards all racial and ethnic groups should 
also be truly low prejudiced. People identifying themselves as not having a universal 
orientation towards all racial and ethnic groups may be more likely to be aversive racists 
because they do see differences in people. Seeing these differences could lead people to 
show implicit bias against others while they still report explicit egalitarianism because 
that is what is socially sanctioned.     
Social Dominance Orientation 
 Social dominance theory states that societies reduce group conflict by creating a 
consensus on ideologies that promote the superiority of one group over others (Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Social dominance orientation (SDO) is the extent 
to which people desire their in-group to be dominant and superior over out-groups (Pratto 
et al.). People holding this belief will endorse laws and institutions that favor their in-
group and reduce equality.  
 Pratto et al. (1994) demonstrated that a measure of social dominance correlated 
very strongly with measures of ethnic prejudice. Social dominance can be viewed as a 
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generalized preference for group dominance that should influence a specific prejudice 
against any given out-group. Pratto et al. particularly stress how correlated a person’s 
social dominance is to anti-Black racism. Social dominance was correlated with anti-
Black prejudice in every sample they ran from .42 to .65 (Pratto et al.).  
 Esses and Hodson (2006) corroborate Pratto et al.’s (1994) results by finding that 
high social dominance-oriented individuals were likely to hold prejudicial attitudes 
toward ethnic groups. Further, Esses and Hodson found that individuals high in social 
dominance blame prejudice on societal factors (i.e., true group difference) instead of 
personal factors (i.e., ignorance); people high in social dominance also do not support 
social change. Henry, Sidanius, Levin, and Pratto (2005) found a positive relationship 
between SDO and support for aggression against an out-group when a socially dominant 
sample completed the measures, but a negative relationship was found between SDO and 
support for aggression against an out-group when a subordinate group completed the 
measures.  
The link between SDO and explicit prejudice has been made, but the question of 
SDO involvement in implicit prejudice has yet to be fully established. Van Heil and 
Mervielde (2005), as stated before, found a relationship between SDO and aversive 
racism, but they defined aversive racism as a reluctance to interact with members of an 
out-group, which is inconsistent with previous definitions. Also, Van Heil and Mervielde 
did not examine implicit attitudes. This study will examine SDO and aversive racism 
according to already established definitions and means. It seems plausible to expect SDO 
to affect implicit prejudice in a similar manner as it does explicit prejudice. People high 
in implicit prejudice will likely score higher on a measure of SDO compared to people 
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low in implicit prejudice.  Further, aversive racists will be more likely to be high in SDO 
because they are not likely to edit themselves when discussing social dominance because 
it is a topic that is not as publicly disavowed as prejudice is.    
Authoritarianism 
 Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is defined as a high degree of submission to 
authorities, a general aggressiveness toward various people that is approved by 
authorities, and a high degree of conformity to social conventions (Altemeyer, 1988). 
Altemeyer suggests RWA should be correlated with racial and ethnic prejudice. By 
examining the definition of RWA this conclusion can be rationalized. In certain 
sociocultural contexts in the United States, social convention is to shun minorities. In 
such contexts, the authoritarian person would conform to this by carrying out the second 
part of the definition by being aggressive toward these groups, believing he or she is 
submitting to authorities. A person with an authoritarian personality would believe that 
authorities approve of this type of prejudice (Altemeyer). This approval is not necessarily 
an actual approval but is at least a perceived approval.  
 RWA Scale scores were found to correlate around .35 with attitude scales that 
measured prejudiced opinions of ethnic and racial groups (Altemeyer). Altemeyer reports 
that people high in authoritarian personality admit to more prejudice and mean-
spiritedness when answering anonymously compared to when there is a possibility to 
identify them through a sign-up sheet. This finding presents a reason for any differences 
found between an implicit measure and explicit measure of prejudice. In the case of an 
explicit measure, the authoritarian person may adjust responses to maintain his or her 
public image. In the case of implicit measures, this adjustment would be impossible 
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because the person would be unable to control an unconscious cognition.  
   Henry et al. (2005) found a significant relationship between RWA and 
intergroup aggression support for an out-group but not for an in-group. Esses and Hodson 
(2006) demonstrated that individuals high in authoritarianism were likely to hold 
prejudiced attitudes as measured on an explicit scale (i.e., Modern Racism Scale) that is 
proposed to have low reactivity (i.e., the items on the scale are recognized to be 
measuring racial prejudice; McConahay, 1986). Van Heil and Mervielde (2005) found a 
connection between RWA and aversive racism, but implicit attitudes were not examined 
in this study. Together, these findings suggest that aversive racists will score higher on a 
RWA measure compared to people low in implicit prejudice. Both sets of people should 
score similarly on explicit measures because of social norms.  
Empathy 
 Empathy is the reaction of a person to the observed experiences of another (Davis, 
1983). Two main components of empathy are perspective taking and concern for another. 
Logically, these two components should lead to lower amounts of prejudice because an 
empathic person is more likely to sympathize with the hardship of out-groups and 
recognize these hardships. Batson et al. (1997) demonstrated that increasing empathy 
toward an individual of a stigmatized group leads to improved attitudes toward the 
overall group. Batson, Chang, Orr, and Rowland (2002) demonstrated that not only does 
increasing empathy towards an individual of a stigmatized group improve attitudes 
towards the overall group, but these improved attitudes also translate into behaviors 
favoring the out-group. Johnson, Brems, and Alford-Keating (1997) found that greater 
amounts of empathy predicted lower prejudice toward an out-group of people (i.e., 
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homosexuals). McFarland (in press) found that empathy correlated negatively with 
generalized prejudice.  
Given that variations of empathy have led to differences in explicit attitudes and 
behaviors towards out-groups (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; Johnson, Brems, & Alford-
Keating, 1997; Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002; McFarland, in press) a difference 
between implicit attitudes is a logical proposition. Aversive racists will likely be low in 
empathy because they are not in touch with their inner attitudes, so they would likely not 
be in tune with others needs and desires. If they are not aware of others needs, desires, 
etc. then they cannot be concerned about those things. Aversive racists may have 
difficulty empathizing with others, which could lead them to not understanding the 
difficulties of others and could further lead them to holding implicit prejudice while they 
explicitly report a lack of prejudice possibly because of social sanctions.      
Social Desirability 
 A common occurrence in survey research is the over reporting of socially 
desirable attitudes and behaviors and the underreporting of attitudes and behaviors that 
are socially undesirable (Krosnick, 1999). Most measures of explicit prejudice are 
questionnaires and so they too would be affected by this phenomenon. Dunton and Fazio 
(1997) found that European-American participants who were motivated to control their 
prejudice reported less prejudiced responses on an explicit attitude measure while their 
unobtrusive estimates indicated negativity in response to African-Americans. European-
American participants who were not motivated to control their prejudice responded on an 
explicit attitude measure consistent with their automatically activated attitudes (Dunton & 
Fazio). Dambrun and Guimond (2004) also found that when there are strong norms 
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against prejudice explicit and implicit measures are negatively correlated. This current 
study will examine the degree that responding in a socially desirable manner contributes 
to aversive racism. Whenever examining a discrepancy between implicit and explicit 
attitudes, social desirability should be examined and possibly controlled for. Aversive 
racists should respond in more socially desirable ways compared to low prejudice people.        
Hypotheses 
 This study attempts to determine what constructs contribute to aversive racism. 
The major hypothesis is that an aversive racist (i.e., a person high in implicit prejudice 
and low in explicit prejudice) will differ from a low prejudice person (i.e., a person low 
in implicit and explicit prejudice) on dimensions of authenticity, moral identity, moral 
judgment development, social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, nonprejudice, and 
social desirability. Specifically, an aversive racist will score higher on dimensions of 
social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, and social desirability compared to a low 
prejudice person. An aversive racist will further score lower on dimensions of 
nonprejudice, moral judgment development, moral identity, and authenticity. 
  20 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants included 120 students from a large Southeastern university. 
Participants were recruited via the Psychology’s study board subject pool. Participants 
included 45 males and 75 females. For class year, 48 were freshmen, 18 were 
sophomores, 22 were juniors, 20 were seniors, and 12 reported other for class year. Only 
participants of European-American descent were used. Other ethnic/racial groups were 
allowed to participate, but their data were not included (n=5). European-Americans were 
specifically examined because the majority of students on Western Kentucky 
University’s campus are European-Americans. More importantly, though, when aversive 
racism was first conceptualized it was propositioned as a phenomenon that exists among 
the majority racial class, particularly European-Americans (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).    
Measures 
 Demographic questionnaire. Participants were asked to record demographic 
information, which includes age, gender, ethnicity, and college year in a demographics 
questionnaire (Appendix A).  
Authenticity. The Authenticity Inventory 3 (AI3; Kernis & Goldman, 2005; 
Appendix B) measures participant's authenticity. The AI3 is composed of 45 five-point 
Likert scale items, ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). The AI3 
generates a composite score and four subcomponent scores: Awareness, Unbiased 
Processing, Behavior, and Relational Orientation. Only the composite score was 
referenced in the current study.  Scores on the composite score can range from 45 to 225 
where higher scores indicate greater authenticity. Higher scores indicate greater amounts 
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of authenticity. Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is reported at α = .83 
for the composite score (Kernis & Goldman). In the current study, Cronbach’s alpha 
measure of internal consistency is reported at α = .88 for the composite score.    
Moral judgment. The Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2; Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & 
Bebeau, 1999; Appendix C) is an objective measurement used to assess moral judgment. 
A participant reads a series of five moral dilemmas and is asked to make an action choice 
about what the protagonist in the dilemma should do. The participant can choose the 
protagonist to either perform an action, not perform an action, or the participant indicates 
that he or she cannot decide. After the action choice has been made, the participant is 
presented with 12 issues that are rated on a scale of 1 to 5 in terms of overall importance 
(1=great importance to 5=no importance) in facilitating the participant in making his or 
her decision about what the protagonist should do. Finally, the participant ranks the four 
most important items of the 12 that were useful in facilitating his or her action choice. 
This process is performed for each dilemma. The issues that the participant rated and 
ranked as important are used to determine what moral judgment schemas (i.e., personal 
interest, maintaining norms, and postconventional) he or she considers important. This is 
an indication of moral judgment development. 
 A variety of indices can be obtained from the DIT-2. This study references the 
Personal Interest (PI), Maintaining Norms (MN), and Postconventional (P) scores. Each 
of these scores ranges from 0-95, with greater scores indicating a greater preference of 
reasoning from that moral judgment development schema. Cronbach’s alpha measure of 
internal consistency is reported at α = .81 for postconventional items (Rest et al., 1999). 
For the current study, Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is α = .73 for 
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personal interest items, α = .71 for maintaining norms items, and α = .79 for 
postconventional items.    
 Moral identity. The Moral Identity Scale is a measure developed by Aquino and 
Reed (2002) to assess a person's self-identification of moral traits (Appendix D). The 
measure is composed of nine moral traits (e.g., Generous, Helpful, etc.) and 10 items 
assessing their self-importance that are rated on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 
(Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). The Moral Identity Scale measures two 
constructs: Internalization and Symbolization. Internalization deals with the amount the 
traits are central to the person's self-concept. Symbolization deals with the amount the 
traits are reflected in the person's behavior. Each construct is composed of five items 
apiece and scores on each range from 5 to 25, with higher scores indicating a greater 
amount of the each respected factor. Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency 
for the Internalization and Symbolization were reported as α = .73 and α = .82, 
respectively (Aquino & Reed). Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency for 
Internalization and Symbolization in the current study is α = .90 and α = .84, respectively.           
Nonprejudice. The Universal Orientation Scale (UOS; Phillips & Ziller, 1997; 
Appendix E) measures a participant's nonprejudice. The scale measures people's 
identification to similarities they have with other people. The UOS is composed of 20 
five-point Likert scale items, ranging from 1 (Does not describe me well) to 5 (Describes 
me very well). Scores range from 20 to 100, where higher scores indicate nonprejudice. 
Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is reported at α = .76 (Phillips & 
Ziller). For the current study, Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is α = 
.67. 
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Social dominance orientation. The Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et 
al., 1994; Appendix F) scale measures a participant's desire for his/her in-group to be 
dominant and superior to other out-groups. The SDO scale is composed of 16 seven-point 
Likert scale items, ranging from 1 (Very negative) to 7 (Very positive). Scores range from 
16 to 112 with low scores indicating endorsement of equality among groups and high 
scores indicating endorsement of domination of certain groups over other groups. 
Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is reported at α = .90 (Pratto et al.). For 
the current study, Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is α = .93.   
Authoritarianism. The Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA; Altemeyer, 
2006; Appendix G) measures a participant’s endorsement of authoritarian ideals. The 
RWA scale is composed of 22 items nine-point Likert scale items, ranging from -4 (Very 
strongly disagree) to 4 (Very strongly agree). Scores can range from 30 to 270 (-4 is 
scored as 1, -3 is scored as 2, … 4 is scored as 9), higher scores indicate a participant’s 
endorsement of authoritarian ideals. Test-retest reliability has been reported to range from 
r=.85 to r=.95 (Altemeyer, 2006). Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is 
reported to range from α = .85 to α = .89 (Altemeyer, 2006). For the current study, 
Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is α = .94.            
  Dispositional empathy. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980; 
Appendix H) measures four different aspects of empathy: fantasy, perspective taking, 
empathic concern, and personal distress. Each subscale is composed of seven items, 
yielding a 28 item measurement overall. Items are responded to on a five-point Likert 
scale, ranging from 0 (Does not describe me very well) to 4 (Describes me very well). 
Scores can range from 0 to 112 with high scores indicating greater amounts of empathy. 
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On all subscales, higher scores indicate greater amounts of empathy in regard to the 
respected scale. Test-retest reliability has been reported to range from r=.61 to r=.81 
(Davis, 1980). Only the composite score is used in the current study.  For the current 
study, Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is α = .82.        
Social desirability. The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding version 6 
(BIDR-6; Paulhus, 1991; Appendix I) measures participants’ manner to respond in 
socially desirable ways. The questionnaire is composed of 40 seven-point Likert items, 
ranging from 1 (Not true) to 7 (Very true). Scores can range from 40 to 280. Higher 
scores imply socially desirable responses. For the current study, Cronbach’s alpha 
measure of internal consistency is α = .76.         
 Explicit prejudice. The Attitude Toward Blacks (ATB; Brigham, 1993; Appendix 
J) is composed of 20 items that measure participant attitudes toward African-Americans. 
Items are ranked on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 
(Strongly agree). Scores on the ATB range from 20 to 140, with lower scores indicating 
negative attitudes toward African-Americans and higher scores indicate positive attitudes 
toward African-Americans. Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is reported 
at α = .88 (Brigham). Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency for the ATB in 
the current study is α = .86.        
 Implicit prejudice. The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998) measures participant's associations of two target concepts with an 
attribute. The IAT is composed of five sequences that are presented via the software 
package Inquisit. In the first sequence, the participant categorizes pictures of faces as 
being either African-American or European-American by selecting a different key on the 
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computer for each category. In the second sequence, the participant categorizes adjectives 
as either pleasant or unpleasant. In the third sequence, the two previous tasks are 
combined and the participant must categorize European-American faces and pleasant 
adjectives with one key and African-American faces and unpleasant adjectives with 
another key. In the fourth sequence, the keys for identifying European-American and 
African-American faces are reversed and the participant categorizes them again. In the 
final sequence, the participant categorizes the European-American faces and unpleasant 
adjectives with one key and the African-American faces and pleasant words with another 
key. If any of the concepts are associated (e.g., African-American faces and pleasant 
adjectives) then the participant should find one of the combination sequences (Sequence 
Three or Five) to be much easier than the other. Ease of identification is noted by 
recording response times. The difference between these two sequences provides the 
measure of implicit attitudinal difference between target concepts.              
Procedure 
 Participants signed up for the study and selected a timeslot via the WKU study 
board. The study was split between two sessions. The study was split into two sessions 
because participants may have become fatigued completing all measures in a single 
session. One session took place online before the participant came into the laboratory. At 
the first session, the participants completed the Moral Identity Scale, BIDR-6, RWA 
scale, SDO scale, UOS, IRI, ATB scale, and the AI3. The second session took place in 
the laboratory. Upon a participant's entry into the lab, the researcher greeted the 
participant and briefly explained the purpose of the study. The participant was then seated 
at a computer. Using the computer, the participant took the IAT and the DIT-2. The IAT 
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was selected to be completed in the lab because it must be run on specific software. The 
DIT-2 was selected to be completed in the lab because the directions for it are long and 
participants often have questions. All of the various measures from the first session were 
counterbalanced and the measures from the second session were counterbalanced. After 
completion of the measures, the participant was thanked for his or her participation and 
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Results 
Descriptive information for participants’ responses to the various questionnaires 
can be found in Table 1.  
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 







































































































Note:  AI3 = Authenticity Inventory 3  Composite Score, PI = DIT-2 Personal Interest Score, MN = DIT-2 
Maintaining Norms Score, P = DIT-2 Postconventional Score, MI-I = Moral Identity Internalization Score, 
MI-S = Moral Identity Score, UOS = Universal Orientation Scale Score, SDO = Social Dominance 
Orientation Scale Score, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarian Score, IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
Score, BI-6 = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding version 6 Score, ATB = Attitude Toward 
Blacks Score, IAT = Implicit Association Test of Race Score. 
 
The sample as a whole reports to be fairly authentic and empathetic, is modal at 
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the postconventional schema of moral judgment development, possesses moderate (i.e., 
symbolization) to high (i.e., internalization) moral identity, tends to see more similarities 
in others than differences, is low in social dominance and authoritarianism, and is neither 
low nor high in responding in a socially desirable manner. Participant responses indicate 
that the group on average is low in explicit prejudice but is slightly high in implicit 
prejudice.  
Correlations among the different measures are noted in Table 2. As marked, 
significant correlations exist among many of the various indices. The strongest 
relationships are seen among the indices that measure similar constructs (e.g., SDO and 
RWA).  
Participants were categorized as being either low or high in explicit prejudice by 
their scores on the ATB. Participants scoring 100 or higher (N=87) were considered to be 
low in explicit prejudice, while those scoring lower than 100 (N=33) were considered to 
be high in explicit prejudice. The score of 100 was determined to be the dividing line 
because if a person responds that he or she slightly agrees (i.e., selects “5,”which 
indicates a lack of prejudice) with the 20 items that person would receive a score of 100. 
Any score below 100 would indicate the person has at least a slight prejudice toward 
African Americans. Because the population of interest were aversive racists (i.e., people 
low in explicit prejudice but high in implicit prejudice), the low explicit prejudice 
participants were further divided into low, mild, and high implicitly prejudiced groups. 
This was accomplished by splitting the low explicit participants into thirds according to 
scores on the IAT. Generally, when dividing participants into high and low scoring, data 






 AI3 PI MN P MI-I MI-S UOS SDO RWA IRI BI-6 ATB IAT 
AI3 1             
PI -0.047 1            
MN -0.013 -.317** 1           
P 0.018 -.475** -.618** 1          
MI-I .197* -0.042 0.016 0.04 1         
MI-S .241** -0.011 0.095 -0.053 .453** 1        
UOS .316** -0.044 -0.081 0.092 .283** .248** 1       
SDO -.316** 0.055 0.065 -0.085 -.196* -0.125 -.348** 1      
RWA -0.038 0.039 .356** -.304** -0.05 0.111 -.203* .399** 1     
IRI 0.16 -0.099 -0.122 0.176 0.149 .319** .346** -.309** -0.102 1    
BI-6 -.394** 0.101 -.179* 0.055 -0.134 -.243** -0.132 0.078 -0.199 -0.103 1   
ATB -.344** 0.147 .188* -.331** -.291** -0.125 -.405** .597** .369** -.332** -0.104 1  
IAT 0.013 0.032 0.065 -0.047 0.114 0.091 0.102 -0.057 0.08 0.017 -0.132 -0.114 1 
 
Note: ** p<.01, * p<.05; AI3 = Authenticity Inventory 3  Composite Score, PI = DIT-2 Personal Interest Score, MN = DIT-2 Maintaining Norms Score, P = DIT-2 
Postconventional Score, MI-I = Moral Identity Internalization Score, MI-S = Moral Identity Score, UOS = Universal Orientation Scale Score, SDO = Social 
Dominance Orientation Scale Score, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarian Score, IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index Score, BI-6 = Balanced Inventory of 
Desirable Responding version 6 Score, ATB = Attitude Toward Blacks Score, IAT = Implicit Association Test of Race Score. 
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 (to assure that the low and high groups really are different from each other). By dividing 
the data into thirds, the middle standard deviation was allowed to become another group 
for analysis rather than completely disregarding the data. Four groups were ultimately 
created for analysis. Group 1 (n = 29) consisted of participants low in explicit prejudice 
and high in implicit prejudice (i.e., aversive racists). Group 2 (n = 29) consisted of 
participants low in explicit prejudice and medium in implicit prejudice (i.e., medium 
implicitly prejudiced). Group 3 (n = 29) consisted of participants low in both explicit and 
implicit prejudice (i.e., truly low prejudiced). Group 4 (n = 33) consisted of participants 
high in explicit prejudice (i.e., explicitly prejudiced). Each group’s mean and standard 
deviation for each dependent variable is noted in Table 3. 
 A series of Multivariate Analyses of Variances (MANOVAs) and Analyses of 
Variances (ANOVAs) were conducted to examine any differences among groups. Moral 
identity subscales (i.e., Internalization and Symbolization), authenticity, and universal 
orientation were examined together in one MANOVA. This group was selected because 
they are theoretically similar in that they deal with aspects of the self, and all four 
constructs were highly correlated. Social dominance orientation and authoritarianism 
were grouped together in one MANOVA. These two variables were examined in 
conjunction because they tend to center around similar ideologies in terms of dominance 
and submission, and are also significantly correlated. Moral judgment developmental 
schemas (i.e., Personal interest, Maintaining norms, and Postconventional) were grouped 
together in one MANOVA. The moral judgment developmental indexes were examined 
together because viewing each index together gives a more complete picture of moral 
judgment development, and are significantly correlated. Social desirability and empathy 
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were examined separately in two ANOVAs. These two constructs were examined alone 
because they did not consistently correlate to a specific group of indices.  
Table 3  
Group Scores on Dependent Variables 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
DV M SD M SD M SD M SD 
AI3 166.07 19.71 163.86 17.27 165.62 17.11 150.73 13.78 
PI 29.42 11.03 22.60 10.57 29.94 11.39 32.65 11.55 
MN 24.57 10.08 25.06 11.78 30.21 13.24 31.72 12.86 
P 40.30 13.79 46.09 16.48 34.13 17.32 27.52 13.49 
MI-I 22.31 4.60 23.52 1.62 24.03 1.24 20.09 5.38 
MI-S 16.59 4.92 16.69 3.64 18.48 3.42 15.94 3.90 
UOS 71.00 8.18 72.62 9.21 73.03 7.16 66.52 5.87 
SDO 34.38 13.25 34.10 16.98 34.93 16.86 54.42 14.58 
RWA 76.90 29.10 78.93 34.46 92.48 32.73 105.61 27.00 
IRI 100.14 15.32 96.52 11.93 95.28 12.31 92.24 11.95 
BI-6 162.48 20.33 157.52 22.75 155.03 37.73 150.73 16.74 
 Note: Group 1 = Aversive Racist (Low Explicit Prejudice, High Implicit Prejudice), Group 2 = Mild 
Implicit Prejudice Group (Low Explicit Prejudice, Mild Implicit Prejudice), Group 3 = Low Prejudice 
Group (Low in Explicit and Implicit Prejudice), Group 4 = High Explicit Prejudice Group (High in Explicit 
Prejudice). AI3 = Authenticity Inventory 3  Composite Score, PI = DIT-2 Personal Interest Score, MN = 
DIT-2 Maintaining Norms Score, P = DIT-2 Postconventional Score, MI-I = Moral Identity Internalization 
Score, MI-S = Moral Identity Score, UOS = Universal Orientation Scale Score, SDO = Social Dominance 
Orientation Scale Score, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarian Score, IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
Score, BI-6 = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding version 6 Score. 
 
The first series of analyses only examined the three implicit groups because the 
original research question involved the differences between aversive racists (i.e., Group 
1) and truly low prejudiced people (i.e., Group 3). Multivariate tests examining 
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authenticity, moral identity subscales, and universal orientation revealed no significant 
differences among the groups. Univariate tests examining these constructs also revealed 
no significant differences.  
 Multivariate tests examining SDO and RWA revealed no significant differences 
among the groups. Univariate tests further revealed no significant differences.  
Multivariate tests examining moral judgment development constructs revealed a 
significant difference among groups (F [6, 166] = 2.765, p < .05, η2 = .091). Univariate 
tests revealed a significant difference among groups for postconventional reasoning (F [2, 
84] = 4.086, p < .05, η2 = .089). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed that the medium 
implicitly prejudiced group operated at a higher level of postconventional reasoning than 
the truly low prejudiced group (p < .05). Univariate tests also reported significant 
differences in personal interest scores (F [2, 84] = 4.017, p < .05, η2 = .087). Bonferonni 
post hoc tests revealed that the truly low prejudiced group operated at a higher level of 
personal interest reasoning than the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05).  
Univariate tests examining social desirability and empathy were performed. 
Neither of these tests revealed significant differences. 
 Additional analyses were also performed, in order to include the explicitly 
prejudiced group. MANOVAs and ANOVAS were performed to assess any differences 
between the explicitly prejudiced group and the three low explicit groups. The same tests 
performed for the low explicit groups were carried out again, with the inclusion of the 
explicitly prejudiced group (i.e., Group 4). Again, moral identity subscales (i.e., 
Internalization and Symbolization), authenticity, and universal orientation were examined 
together in one MANOVA. Social dominance orientation and authoritarianism were 
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grouped together in one MANOVA. Moral judgment development schemas (i.e., 
Personal interest, Maintaining norms, and Postconventional) were grouped together in 
one MANOVA. Social desirability and empathy were examined separately in two 
ANOVAs.  
Multivariate tests examining authenticity, moral identity subscales, and universal 
orientation revealed a significant difference (F [12, 345] = 3.215, p < .01, η2 = .101). 
Univariate tests revealed a significant difference among groups on moral identity 
internalization (F [3, 116] = 6.863, p < .01, η2 = .151). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed 
that the explicitly prejudiced group was lower in internalization than the medium 
implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05) and lower than the truly low prejudiced group (p < 
.05). Univariate tests further revealed a significant difference among groups on 
authenticity (F [3, 116] = 5.861, p < .01, η2 = .132). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed 
that the explicitly prejudiced group was lower in authenticity than the aversive racist 
group (p < .05), than the medium explicitly prejudiced group (p < .05), and lower than 
the truly low prejudiced group (p < .05). Univariate tests further revealed a significant 
difference among groups on universal orientation (F [3, 116] = 4.819, p < .01, η2 = .111). 
Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed that the explicitly prejudiced group was lower in 
universal orientation than the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05) and lower 
than the truly low prejudiced group (p < .05).  
Multivariate tests examining RWA and SDO revealed a significant difference (F 
[6,232] = 7.015, p < .01, η2 = .154). Univariate tests revealed a significant difference 
among groups in RWA (F [3, 116] = 5.834, p < .01, η2 = .131). Bonferonni post hoc tests 
revealed that the explicitly prejudiced group was higher in RWA than the aversive racist 
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group (p < .05) and higher than the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05). 
Univariate tests revealed a significant difference among groups in SDO (F [3, 116] = 
13.290, p < .001, η2 = .256). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed that the explicitly 
prejudiced group was higher in SDO than the aversive racist group (p < .05), higher than 
the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05), and higher than the truly low 
prejudiced group (p < .05).    
Multivariate tests examining moral judgment development constructs revealed a 
significant difference among groups (F [9, 348] = 3.500, p < .001, η2 = .083). Univariate 
tests revealed a significant difference among groups for postconventional reasoning (F [3, 
116] = 8.415, p < .001, η2 = .179). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed that the explicitly 
prejudiced group was lower in postconventional reasoning than both the aversive racist 
group (p < .05) and the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05). Bonferonni post 
hoc test also showed that the medium implicitly prejudiced group was higher than the low 
implicit/low explicit group (p < .05). Univariate tests revealed a significant difference 
among groups for maintaining norms reasoning (F [3, 116] = 2.720, p < .05, η2 = .066). 
Bonferonni post hoc tests did not reveal any significant differences among the groups, 
though the explicitly prejudiced and truly low prejudiced groups were higher than the 
aversive racist and medium implicitly prejudiced groups. Univariate tests revealed a 
significant difference among groups for personal interest reasoning (F [3, 116] = 4.421, p 
< .05, η2 = .103). Bonferonni post hoc test showed that the explicitly prejudiced group 
was higher in personal interest reasoning than the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p 
< .05). 
Univariate tests examining social desirability and empathy were performed. 
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Neither of these tests revealed significant differences. 
In summary, no significant differences were found between aversive racist and 
truly low prejudiced people. The medium implicitly prejudiced group was found to 
reference postconventional reasoning more often than the truly low prejudiced group. The 
truly low prejudiced group was also found to emphasize personal interest reasoning more 
often than the medium implicitly prejudiced group. The explicitly prejudiced group 
differed from the other three groups (i.e., aversive racist, medium implicitly prejudiced, 
and truly low prejudiced groups) on every construct with the exception of social 





 The purpose of this study was to determine what distinguishes those who are truly 
low prejudiced from aversive racists. Eight different constructs were considered. These 
constructs were authenticity, moral judgment development, moral identity, nonprejudice, 
social dominance, authoritarianism, empathy, and social desirability. Specifically, it was 
proposed that aversive racists would score higher on dimensions of social dominance, 
authoritarianism, and social desirability compared to truly low prejudiced people. 
Further, it was hypothesized that aversive racists would score lower on dimensions of 
nonprejudice, moral judgment development, moral identity, and authenticity.  
To test participants on these various aspects, participants were divided into groups 
according to their scores on an explicit and an implicit measure of attitudes regarding 
African Americans. Participants who had scores indicating low prejudice on the explicit 
measure were further divided according to their scores on the implicit measure into low, 
medium, and high groups. Participants who were low in explicit prejudice and high in 
implicit prejudice were categorized as aversive racists, while those low in explicit and 
implicit prejudice were categorized as truly low prejudiced.     
 It was hypothesized that aversive racists would differ from truly low prejudiced 
people on eight different constructs. The data presented here indicate that aversive racists 
did not differ from low prejudice people on any of the examined constructs. The only 
significant differences found were between the low prejudice group and the medium 
implicit prejudice group. The low prejudice group operated from the personal interest 
schema to a greater extent than the medium implicit prejudice group. Also, the medium 




than the low prejudice group.  
Unlike Van Heil and Mervielde (2005), aversive racists were not found to differ 
from low prejudice people on social dominance orientation or authoritarianism. This may 
be due to the differences in how aversive racism was defined in the two studies. In the 
Van Heil and Mervielde study, aversive racism was defined as a reluctance to interact 
with a member of an out-group. In addition, the samples used in the two studies varied 
from each other, the Van Heil and Mervielde sample consisted of Europeans, while this 
study’s sample consisted of U.S. citizens. It may be possible that aversive racists are 
more pronounced in the European culture, which may explain the differences found 
between the current study and the Van Heil and Mervielde study.       
 Further analyses comparing participants who were high in explicit prejudice to 
participants low in explicit prejudice (i.e., the three aforementioned groups) were 
performed. The low explicit and high explicit groups were compared on the same eight 
constructs: authenticity, moral judgment development, moral identity, nonprejudice, 
social dominance, authoritarianism, empathy, and social desirability. These analyses 
found that participants high in explicit prejudice scored lower on moral identity 
internalization, authenticity, nonprejudice, and postconventional moral reasoning 
compared to participants low in explicit prejudice. Those participants high in explicit 
prejudice also displayed greater amounts of social dominance orientation, 
authoritarianism, and personal interest moral reasoning compared to participants low in 
explicit prejudice.  
 The differences found between people high in explicit prejudice and people low in 




the McFarland (in press) study, postconventional reasoning was found to differentiate 
people who differed in explicit prejudice. In keeping with the trend (i.e., Phillips & Ziller, 
1997), people low in explicit prejudice were found to have greater amounts of 
nonprejudice compared to people high in explicit prejudice. People high in explicit 
prejudice displayed greater amounts of social dominance orientation compared to those 
low in explicit prejudice, which replicates Pratto et al. (1994). People high in explicit 
prejudice displayed greater amounts of authoritarianism compared to those low in explicit 
prejudice, which supports Altemeyer (1988).  
 People high in explicit prejudice were also found to differ on levels of 
authenticity and moral identity, which has not been documented before. People high in 
explicit prejudice were found to have lower authenticity scores compared to people low 
in explicit prejudice. This suggests that explicitly prejudice people do not understand 
themselves as well as people with less explicit prejudice do. People high in explicit 
prejudice were also found to have lower moral identity internalization scores compared to 
people low in explicit prejudice. This suggests that moral traits are not as large a portion 
of the explicitly prejudiced person’s life in comparison to the non-explicitly prejudiced 
person. This finding also supports the validity of the Moral Identity Scale because a 
person high in explicit prejudice would not be expected to have a high moral identity.  
 Overall, the data suggest that being an aversive racist may not have a truly 
significant effect on a person’s life – at least as far as the constructs considered in this 
study are concerned. While people who explicitly express a lack of prejudice may have 
implicit prejudices, it appears that these biases are not transferred to other relevant areas. 




person explicitly reports. People that are explicitly prejudiced differ from people who are 
not explicitly prejudiced on many different aspects. Even though a person’s implicit 
attitude may differ from his or her explicit attitude, the current study supports that it is the 
person’s explicit attitude that truly matters where the measured areas are concerned. 
 Another point arises from the data. The mild implicit prejudice group and the 
aversive racists both had fairly high postconventional scores compared to the low 
prejudice group (The mild implicit prejudiced group differed significantly from the low 
prejudice group, and the mild implicit prejudiced group and the aversive racists did not 
significantly differ from each other). Having a high postconventional score could be the 
factor that allows these people to keep from either acting on or transferring their implicit 
biases to other areas. This finding may therefore support Rest’s four component model of 
moral functioning (Narvaez & Rest, 1995). This model suggests that moral behavior is a 
factor of four components: Moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and 
implementation. In regards to the moral functioning of the mild implicit prejudice and 
aversive racist groups, having a high postconventional score could be what prevents their 
implicit prejudice from bypassing their moral motivation.  Because this study did not 
obtain any behavioral data from the participants, there is another possibility that Rest’s 
four component model (Narvaez & Rest) would support.  It might be that implicit biases 
exist among the mild prejudice and aversive racist groups exist due to deficiencies in 
components like moral sensitivity and/or moral motivation. 
 An additional aspect needs to be considered in explaining the findings of this 
study. The lack of differentiation between aversive racists and low prejudice people may 




presents pictures of African-Americans and European-Americans along with negative 
and positive words (Greenwald et al., 1998). Because of this, scores can be interpreted in 
three ways: biased against African-Americans, biased against European-Americans, or 
unbiased. The presence of a negative bias against African-Americans was the concern in 
this study. Participants that displayed negative bias against European-Americans were 
still included in the analysis and because of the manner in which the participants were 
categorized, they were further included into the low prejudice group (because they 
showed no bias against African-Americans). The similarity of scores between aversive 
racists (implicit bias against African-Americans) and truly low prejudiced people (some 
of which display bias against European-Americans) may be due to the presence of some 
sort of bias against a racial or ethnic group existing in both groups. 
Strengths and Limitations 
 Before discussing strengths, the limitations of the study will be addressed. In 
labeling participants as aversive racists, the IAT was used to distinguish participants in 
regards to their implicit biases (or lack thereof). Since the inception of the IAT, the 
method has been criticized. Arkes and Tetlock (2004) suggest different interpretations of 
IAT scores. The effects seen in the IAT may be due to cultural stereotypes rather than 
personal beliefs or due to cognitive processes that are not necessarily prejudiced (Arkes 
& Tetlock). Kinoshita and Peek-O’Leary (2005) suggest that the negative bias seen 
against a certain ethnic or racial group can be due to familiarity rather than actual 
negative affect toward that group. Because these interpretations are plausible, it is 
possible that the scores from the IAT in the current study may be due to these other 




and truly low prejudiced people, as defined in this study, is understandable.  
 A further limitation concerning the IAT is its duel nature. The IAT can assess bias 
against African-Americans and European-Americans. If a person shows bias against 
African-Americans, then he or she will not show bias against European-Americans, when 
in actuality they may hold a negative affect against both sets of people. The lack of a 
score suggesting bias against a certain group may not necessarily mean that negative 
associations do not exist for that group. It may instead mean that a certain person has 
equally negative associations against more than one group of people, or perhaps the 
person has a more negative association with another group. The point remains, however, 
that a person may have a negative association even if the IAT does not suggest the person 
does.  
 Another limitation associated with this study is generalizability of the results. 
Because of the original definition of an aversive racist (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), only 
European-Americans were examined. This greatly limits the generalizability of the 
results to only one race in a nation where multiple races and ethnic groups coexist. The 
sample was also young adult college students and did not represent all ages during 
adulthood.  
Finally, participants were categorized into groups according to continuous 
variables. Normative data were not available to ensure the way the groups were 
categorized was the most accurate division of the participants. The groups were 
determined by cut off points that theoretically seemed to distinguish high and low 
prejudice. Without normative data to support these cut off points, the accuracy of these 




 A strength associated with this study is the wide variety of constructs considered 
in the examination of aversive racism. This study incorporated many different constructs 
in order to achieve a more detailed picture of the topic of interest. Another strength of 
this study was the manner in which the data was collected in two sessions. This allowed 
participants to keep from becoming fatigued and becoming apathetic in their responses. 
 Further, this study helps bring more understanding to the concept of prejudice and 
behavior related to prejudice. Crimes committed against a person that are motivated by 
the offenders’ bias against race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or 
ethnicity/nationality (i.e., hate crimes) total to 9,035 in 2004 (Department of Justice, 
2004). Of those 9,035 crimes, 6,064 were committed because of race and or ethnicity 
(Department of Justice). Given these high rates of crime, which are motivated by 
prejudices, understanding prejudice – whether implicit or explicit – is imperative. This 
study assists in understanding the phenomenon of prejudice.      
Future Directions 
 In the future, the inclusion of more racial and ethnic groups into the sample would 
be a great improvement. This would allow the data to be generalized to a greater 
proportion of the population. Also, other biases against more racial and ethnic groups 
should be examined. While certain things may be true for explicit and implicit biases 
against African-Americans, it would be interesting to see if these same sorts of trends 
hold for biases against other ethnic groups.  
 Other methods for categorizing people as aversive racists should also be used to 
determine if the results from this current study hold up, or if they had been distorted 




people are categorized as aversive racists according to a behavioral task. Generally, 
participants are given a task where they select people for admittance to a college, 
employment, or pay raises (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Hodson, Dovidio, & 
Gaertner, 2002). Using a task in which participants make a selection decision based on 
ambiguous information has demonstrated that some people tend to make decisions 
favoring their own racial group. Using the selection decision task may be a better method 
for categorizing aversive racists than the IAT. Further, using behavioral data could 
further confirm the groupings used for this study and help draw more precise conclusions 
about aversive racism. For instance, it may confirm that it translates to behavior but not 
to other related areas (such as those addressed in this study).  
 The finding that participants high and mild in implicit prejudice have elevated 
postconventional scores compared to low prejudice participants suggests more 
examination in this area are warranted. As noted earlier, Rest’s four component model 
makes the findings of this study interpretable in two different ways. Hence, a future study 
should examine other components of Rest’s four component model of moral functioning 
(i.e., moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and implementation) to 
determine how aversive racism best fits into this model.     
Conclusion 
In conclusion, no significant differences were found between aversive racists and 
low prejudice people. Further evidence was found distinguishing people high in explicit 
prejudice from people low in explicit prejudice. The results suggest three implications. 
First, while a person may have implicit biases, what appears to matter more is what that 




postconventional scores, which could be the factor that is keeping these people from 
transferring their implicit prejudices to other aspects of their lives. Third, the lack of 
distinction between aversive racists and low prejudice people may be due to an artifact of 
the IAT. While no constructs were found to differ between aversive racists and low 
prejudice people, further exploration with a different method of labeling participants as 






















Altemeyer, B. (2006). The authoritarians. Winnipeg, Canada: Bob Altemeyer. 
Altemeyer, B. (1988). Enemies of freedom: Understanding right-wing authoritarianism. 
  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.   
Aquino, K., & Reed, A., II. (2002). The self-importance of moral identity. Journal of 
 Personality and Social Psychology, 83(6), 1423-1440. 
Arkes, H. R., & Tetlock, P. E. (2004). Attributions of implicit prejudice, or “would Jesse 
  Jackson ‘fail’ the implicit association test?” Psychological Inquiry, 15(4), 257-
 278.  
Asendorpf, J. B., Banse, R., & Mucke, D. (2002). Double dissociation between implicit 
 and explicit personality self-concept: The case of shy behavior. Journal of 
 Personality and Social Psychology, 83(2), 380-393. 
Baron, A. S., & Banaji, M. R. (2006). The development of implicit attitudes: Evidence of 
 race evaluations from ages 6 and 10 and adulthood. Psychological Science, 17(1), 
 53-58. 
Batson, C. D., Chang, J., Orr, R., & Rowland, J. (2002). Empathy, attitudes, and action: 
 Can feeling for a member of a stigmatized group motivate one to help the group? 
 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 1656-1666. 
Batson, C. D., Polycarpou, M. P., Harmon-Jones, E., Imhoff, H. J., Mitchener, E. C., 
 Bednar, L. L., Klein, T. R., & Highberger, L. (1997). Empathy and attitudes: Can 
 feeling for a member of a stigmatized group improve feelings toward the group? 
 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 105-118. 




 (Eds.), Morality, moral behavior and moral development (pp. 128-139). New 
 York: Wiley. 
Blasi, A. (1993). The development of identity: Some implications for moral functioning. 
 In G. G. Naom & T. E. Wren (Eds.), The moral self (pp.99-122). Cambridge, MA: 
 MIT Press. 
Brigham, J. C. (1993). College students’ racial attitudes. Journal of Applied Social 
 Psychology, 23, 1933-1967. 
Dambrun, M., & Guimond, S. (2004). Implicit and explicit measures of prejudice and 
 stereotyping: Do they assess the same underlying knowledge structure? European 
 Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 663-676. 
Davis, M. H. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. 
 JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology, 10, 85. 
Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a 
 multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44(1), 
  113-126. 
Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation (2004). Crime in the United 
 States 2004. Retrieved April 4, 2008, from Department of Justice Web site: 
 http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/index.html.  
Derryberry, W. P., & Thoma, S. J. (2005). Moral judgment, self-understanding, and 
 moral actions: The role of multiple constructs. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 51(1), 
 67-92. 
Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2000). Aversive racism and selection decisions: 1989 




Dunton, B. C., & Fazio, R. H. (1997). An individual difference measure of motivation to 
 control prejudiced reactions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(3), 
 316-326. 
Esses, V. M., & Hodson, G. (2006). The role of lay perceptions of ethnic prejudice in the 
 maintenance and perpetuation of ethnic bias. Journal of Social Issues, 62(3), 453-
 468. 
Fazio, R. H. (1990). Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behavior: The MODE 
 model as an integrative framework. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in 
 experimental social psychology (Vol. 23, pp. 75-109). New York: Academic 
 Press. 
Fazio, R. H., & Towles-Schwen, T. (1999). The MODE model of attitude-behavior 
 processes. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual -process theories in social 
 psychology. New York: Guilford Press.  
Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (1986). The aversive form of racism. In J. F. Dovidio & 
 S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and racism. New York: 
 Academic Press. 
Goldman, B. M., & Kernis, M. H. (2002). The role of authenticity in healthy 
 psychological functioning and subjective well-being. Annals of the American 
 Psychotherapy Association, 5(6), 18-20. 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual 
 differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of 
 Personality and Social Psychology, 74(6), 1464-1480. 




 of moral identity in adolescence. Journal of Social Issues, 54, 513-530. 
Henry, P. J., Sidanius, J., Levin, S., Pratto, F. (2005). Social dominance orientation, 
 authoritarianism, and support for intergroup violence between the Middle East 
 and America. Political Psychology, 26(4), 569-583. 
Hodson, G., Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2002). Processes in racial discrimination: 
  Differential weighting of conflicting information. Personality and Social  
  Psychology Bulletin, 28(4), 460-471. 
Johnson, M. E., Brems, C., & Alford-Keating, P. (1997). Personality correlates of 
 homophobia. Journal of Homosexuality, 34, 57-69. 
Kernis, M. H., & Goldman, B. M. (2005). Authenticity, social motivation, and 
 psychological  adjustment. In J. P. Forgas, K. D. Williams, & S. M. Laham (Eds.), 
  Social motivation: Conscious and unconscious processes (pp. 210-227). New 
 York: Cambridge University Press. 
Kinoshita, S., & Peek-O’Leary, M. (2005). Does the compatibility effect in the race 
 implicit association test reflect familiarity or affect? Psychonomic Bulletin & 
  Review, 12(3), 442-452. 
Krosnick, J. A. (1999). Survey research. Annual Review of Psychology, 50, 537-567. 
 McConahay, J. B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the modern racism scale. In 
  J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and racism. 
 New York: Academic Press. 
McFarland, S. (In press). Authoritarianism, social dominance, and other roots of 
 generalized prejudice. Political Psychology. 




  issues test is supported by cognitive science. Journal of Moral Education, 31(3), 
 297-314. 
Narvaez, D., & Rest, J. (1995). The four components of acting morally. In W. Kurtines & 
 J. Gewirtz (Eds.), Moral development: An introduction (pp. 385-399). Boston: 
 Allyn & Bacon. 
Paulhus, D. L. (1991). Measurement and control of response bias. In J. P. Robinson,  
P. R. Shaver, & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), Measures of personality and 
social psychological attitudes (pp. 17–59). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Phillips, S. T., & Ziller, R. C. (1997). Toward a theory and measure of the nature of 
 nonprejudice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(2), 420-434. 
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance 
 orientation: A  personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. 
 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(4), 741-763. 
Reed, A., II, & Aquino, K. F. (2003). Moral identity and the expanding circle of moral 
 regard  toward out-groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(6), 
 1270-1286.  
Rest, J., Narvaez, D., Bebeau, M., & Thoma, S. (1999). A neo-Kohlbergian approach: 
  The DIT and schema theory. Educational Psychological Review, 11(4), 291-324. 
Rest, J. R., Narvaez, D., Thoma, S. J., & Bebeau, M. J. (1999). DIT2: Devising and 
  testing a revised instrument of moral judgment. Journal of Educational 
 Psychology, 91(4), 644-659. 
Rest, J. R., Narvaez, D., Thoma, S. J., & Bebeau, M. J. (2000). A neo-Kohlbergian 




Silvestri, T. J., & Richardson, T. Q. (2001). White racial identity statuses and NEO 
 personality constructs: An exploratory analysis. Journal of Counseling & 
 Development, 79, 68-76. 
Son Hing, L., Li, W., & Zanna, M. P. (2002). Inducing hypocrisy to reduce prejudicial 
 responses among aversive racists. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 
 71-78. 
Van Heil, A., & Mervielde, I. (2005). Authoritarianism and social dominance orientation: 
 Relationships with various forms of racism. Journal of Applied Social 













































1. Age:_____ years. 
2. Gender (circle one): Male     Female 
3. Education level:   ______ Freshman 
                                 ______ Sophomore 
                                 ______ Junior 
                                 ______ Senior 
                                 ______ Other: _______________ 
4. Ethnicity (optional): 
   _______ African American 
                                   ________ American Indian of Alaska Native 
                                   ________ Asian 
                                   ________ European American 
            ________ Hispanic/Latino 
                                  ________ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 

















































The following measure has a variety of statements that involves peoples’ perceptions about their 
self. There are no right or wrong responses so please answer honestly. Use the following scale 
when responding to each statement by writing the number from the scale below which you feel 
most accurately characterizes your response to the statement. 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
              Strongly      Disagree    Neither Agree     Agree       Strongly    
              Disagree      Nor Disagree            Agree 
 
_____1. I am often confused about my feelings. 
 
_____2. I frequently pretend to enjoy something when in actuality I really don't. 
 
_____3. For better or for worse I am aware of who I truly am. 
 
_____4. I understand why I believe the things I do about myself. 
 
_____5. I want people with whom I am close to understand my strengths. 
 
_____6. I actively try to understand which of my self-aspects fit together to form my  
              core or true self. 
 
_____7. I am very uncomfortable objectively considering my limitations and shortcomings. 
 
_____8. I’ve often used my silence or head-nodding to convey agreement with someone  
  else’s statement or position even though I really disagree. 
 
_____9. I have a very good understanding of why I do the things I do. 
 
_____10. I am willing to change myself for others if the reward is desirable enough. 
 
_____11. I find it easy to pretend to be something other than my true self. 
 
_____12. I want people with whom I am close to understand my weaknesses. 
 
_____13. I find it very difficult to critically assess myself. 
 
_____14. I am not in touch with my deepest thoughts and feelings. 
 
_____15. I make it a point to express to close others how much I truly care for them. 
 
_____16. I tend to have difficulty accepting my personal faults, so I try to cast them in a  
                more positive way. 
 





_____18. If asked, people I am close to can accurately describe what kind of person I am. 
 
_____19. I prefer to ignore my darkest thoughts and feelings. 
 
_____20. I am aware of when I am not being my true self. 
 
_____21. I am able to distinguish those self-aspects that are important to my core or true  
                self from those that are unimportant. 
 
_____22. People close to me would be shocked or surprised if they discovered what I  
                keep inside me. 
 
_____23. It is important for me to understand my close others' needs and desires. 
 
_____24. I want close others to understand the real me rather than just my public persona  
                or "image" 
 
_____25. I try to act in a manner that is consistent with my personally held values, even  
                if others criticize or reject me for doing so. 
 
_____26. If a close other and I are in disagreement I would rather ignore the issue than  
                constructively work it out. 
 
_____27. I’ve often done things that I don’t want to do merely not to disappoint people. 
 
_____28. I find that my behavior typically expresses my values. 
 
_____29. I actively attempt to understand myself as best as possible. 
 
_____30. I’d rather feel good about myself than objectively assess my personal  
                limitations and shortcomings. 
 
_____31. I find that my behavior typically expresses my personal needs and desires. 
 
_____32. I rarely if ever, put on a “false face” for others to see 
 
_____33. I spend a lot of energy pursuing goals that are very important to other people  
                even though they are unimportant to me. 
 
_____34. I frequently am not in touch with what’s important to me. 
 
_____35. I try to block out any unpleasant feelings I might have about myself. 
 
_____36. I often question whether I really know what I want to accomplish in my  





_____37. I often find that I am overly critical about myself. 
 
_____38. I am in touch with my motives and desires. 
 
_____39. I often deny the validity of any compliments that I receive. 
 
_____40. In general, I place a good deal of importance on people I am close to  
                understanding who I truly am. 
 
_____41. I find it difficult to embrace and feel good about the things I have accomplished. 
 
_____42. If someone points out or focuses on one of my shortcomings I quickly try to  
                block it out of my mind and forget it. 
 
_____43. The people I am close to can count on me being who I am regardless of what  
                setting we are in. 
 
_____44. My openness and honesty in close relationships are extremely important to me. 
 
_____45. I am willing to endure negative consequences by expressing my true beliefs  























































Defining Issues Test 2 
 
FAMINE 
The small village in northern India has experienced shortages of food before, but 
this year's famine is worse than ever. Some families are even trying to sustain themselves 
by making soup from tree bark. Mustaq Singh's family is near starvation. He had heard 
that a rich man in his village has supplies of food stored away and is hoarding food while 
its price goes higher so that he can sell the food later at a huge profit. Mustaq was 
desperate and thinks about stealing some food from the rich man's warehouse. The small 
amount of food that he needs for his family probably wouldn't be missed.   
 
What should Mustaq Singh do?  Do you favor the action of taking the food? (Mark one)   
  
___ Should take the food ____ Can’t Decide ____ Should not take the food 
 
Please rate in the space beside each statement how important each particular 
item/question is in making a decision about what you should do one way or another.  
 
1=Great  2=Much  3=Some  4=Little  5=No 
1. Is Mustaq Singh courageous enough to risk getting caught stealing? ___ 
2. Isn't it only natural for a loving father to care so much for his family that he would 
steal? ___ 
3. Shouldn't the community's laws be upheld? ___ 
4. Does Mustaq Singh know a good recipe for preparing soup from tree bark? ___ 
5. Does the rich man have any legal right to store food when other people are  
starving? ___ 
6. Is the motive of Mustaq Singh to steal for himself or to steal for his family? ___ 
7. What values are going to be the basis for social cooperation? ___ 
8. Is the epitome of eating reconcilable with the culpability of stealing?___ 
9. Does the rich man deserve to be robbed for being so greedy? ___ 
10. Isn't private property an institution to enable the rich to exploit the poor? ___ 
11. Would stealing bring about more total good for everybody concerned or not? ___ 
12. Are laws getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of society? ___ 
 
 
Now that you have rated these items, please rank them below from most important to 
fourth most important in making a decision about what Mustaq Singh should do. 
 
_____ # of Most important item _____ # of Third most important item 
  
_____ # of Second most important _____ # of Fourth most important item 
 
REPORTER 
Molly Dayton has been a news reporter for the Gazette newspaper for over a 
decade. Almost by accident, she learned that one of the candidates for Lieutenant 
Governor for her state, Grover Thompson, had been arrested for shop-lifting, 20 years 
earlier. Reporter Dayton found out that early in his life, Candidate Thompson had 




character now. His shop-lifting had been a minor offense and charges had been dropped 
by the department store. Thompson has not only straightened himself out since then, but 
in addition built a distinguished record in helping many people and in leading community 
projects. Now, Reporter Dayton regards Thompson as the best candidate in the field and 
likely to go on to important leadership positions in the state. Reporter Dayton wonders 
whether or not she should write the story about Thompson's earlier troubles because in 
the upcoming close and heated election, she fears that such a news story would wreck 
Thompson's chance to win. 
 
Do you favor the action of reporting the story? (Mark one)  
  
___ Should report the story ____ Can’t Decide ____ Should not report the story 
 
Please rate in the space beside each statement how important each particular 
item/question is in making a decision about what you should do one way or another.  
 
1=Great  2=Much  3=Some  4=Little  5=No 
 
1. Doesn't the public have a right to know all the facts about all the candidates for  
office? ___ 
2. Would publishing the story help Reporter Dayton's reputation for investigative 
reporting? ___ 
3. If Dayton doesn't publish the story wouldn't another reporter get the story anyway and 
get the credit for investigative reporting? ___ 
4. Since voting is such a joke anyway, does it make any difference what reporter Dayton 
does? ___ 
5. Hasn't Thompson shown in the past 20 years that he is a better person than his earlier 
days as a shop-lifter? ___ 
6. What would best serve society? ___ 
7. If the story is true, how can it be wrong to report it? ___ 
8. How could reporter Dayton be so cruel and heartless as to report the damaging story 
about candidate Thompson? ___ 
9. Does the right of 'habeas corpus' apply in this case? ___ 
10. Would the election process be more fair with or without reporting the story? ___ 
11. Should reporter Dayton treat all candidates for office in the same way by reporting 
everything she learns about them, good and bad? ___ 
12. Isn't it a reporter's duty to report all the news regardless of the circumstances? ___ 
 
 
Now that you have rated these items, please rank them below from most important to 
fourth most important in making a decision about what Reporter Dayton should do. 
 
_____ # of Most important item _____ # of Third most important item 
  





Mr. Grant was elected to the School Board District 190 and was chosen to be 
Chairman. The district was bitterly divided over the closing of one of the high schools. 
One of the high schools had to be closed for financial reasons, but there was no 
agreement over which school to close. During his election to the School Board, Mr. Grant 
had proposed a series of "Open Meetings" in which members of the community could 
voice their opinions. He hoped that dialogue would make the community realize the 
necessity of closing one high school. Also he hoped that through open discussion, the 
difficulty of the decision would be appreciated, and the community would ultimately 
support the school board decision. The first Open Meeting was a disaster. Passionate 
speeches dominated the microphones and threatened violence. The meeting barely closed 
without fist-fights. Later in the week, school board members received threatening phone 
calls. Mr. Grant wonders if he ought to call off the next Open Meeting.   
 
Do you favor calling off the next Open Meeting?  (Mark one) 
  
___ Should call off the next open meeting   ____ Can’t Decide   ____ Should have the next 
open meeting 
 
Please rate in the space beside each statement how important each particular 
item/question is in making a decision about what you should do one way or another.  
 
1=Great  2=Much  3=Some  4=Little  5=No 
 
 
1. Is Mr. Grant required by law to have Open Meetings on major school board  
decisions? ___ 
2. Would Mr. Grant be breaking his election campaign promises to the community by 
discontinuing the Open Meetings? ___ 
3. Would the community be even angrier with Mr. Grant if he stopped the Open 
Meetings? ___ 
4. Would the change in plans prevent scientific assessment? ___ 
5. If the school board is threatened, does the chairman have the legal authority to protect 
the Board by making decisions in closed meetings? ___ 
6. Would the community regard Mr. Grant as a coward if he stopped the Open  
Meetings? ___ 
7. Does Mr. Grant have another procedure in mind for ensuring that divergent views are 
heard? ___ 
8. Does Mr. Grant have the authority to expel troublemakers from the meetings or 
prevent them from making long speeches? ___ 
9. Are some people deliberately undermining the school board process by playing some 
sort of power game? ___ 
10. What effect would stopping the discussion have on the community's ability to handle 
controversial issues in the future? ___  
11. Is the trouble coming from only a few hotheads, and is the community in general 
really fair-minded and democratic? ___ 
12. What is the likelihood that a good decision could be made without open discussion 




Now that you have rated these items, please rank them below from most important to 
fourth most important in making a decision about what Mr. Grant should do. 
 
_____ # of Most important item _____ # of Third most important item 
  
_____ # of Second most important _____ # of Fourth most important item 
 
CANCER 
Mrs. Bennett is 62 years old, and in the last phases of colon cancer. She is in 
terrible pain and asks the doctor to give her more pain-killer medicine. The doctor has 
given her the maximum safe dose already and is reluctant to increase the dosage because 
it would probably hasten her death. In a clear and rational mental state, Mrs. Bennett says 
that she realizes this; but she wants to end her suffering even if it means ending her life. 
Should the doctor giver her an increased dosage? 
 
Do you favor the action of giving more medicine?  (Mark one) 
  
____ Should give Mrs. Bennett an increased dosage to make her die  
____ Can’t Decide  
____ Should not give her an increased dosage 
 
Please rate in the space beside each statement how important each particular 
item/question is in making a decision about what you should do one way or another.  
 
1=Great  2=Much  3=Some  4=Little  5=No 
 
 
1. Isn't the doctor obligated by the same laws as everybody else if giving an overdose 
would be the same as killing her? ___ 
2. Wouldn't society be better off without so many laws about what doctors can and 
cannot do? ___ 
3. If Mrs. Bennett dies, would the doctor be legally responsible for malpractice? ___ 
4. Does the family of Mrs. Bennett agree that she should get more painkiller  
medicine? ___ 
5. Is the painkiller medicine an active heliotropic drug? ___ 
6. Does the state have the right to force continued existence on those who don't want to 
live? ___ 
7. Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible act of cooperation? ___ 
8. Would the doctor show more sympathy for Mrs. Bennett by giving the medicine or 
not? ___ 
9. Wouldn't the doctor feel guilty from giving Mrs. Bennett so much drug that she  
died? ___ 
10. Should only God decide when a person's life should end? ___ 
11. Shouldn't society protect everyone against being killed? ___ 
12. Where should society draw the line between protecting life and allowing someone to 






Now that you have rated these items, please rank them below from most important to 
fourth most important in making a decision about what the doctor should do. 
 
_____ # of Most important item _____ # of Third most important item 
  






Political and economic instability in a South American country prompted the 
President of the United States to send troops to "police" the area. Students at many 
campuses in the U.S.A. have protested that the United States was using its military might 
for economic advantage. There is widespread suspicion that big oil multinational 
companies were pressuring the President to safeguard a cheap oil supply even if it means 
loss of life. Students at one campus took to the streets in demonstration, tying up traffic 
and stopping regular business in town. The president of the university demanded that the 
students stop their illegal demonstrations. Students then took over the college's 
administration building, completely paralyzing the college. Are the students right to 
demonstrate in these ways? 
 
Do you favor the action of demonstrating in these ways?   
  
____ Should continue demonstrating in these ways   
___ Can’t Decide    
____ Should not continue demonstrating in these ways 
 
Please rate in the space beside each statement how important each particular 
item/question is in making a decision about what you should do one way or another.  
 
1=Great  2=Much  3=Some  4=Little  5=No 
 
 
1. Do the students have any right to take over property that doesn't belong to them? ___ 
2. Do the students realize that they might be arrested and fined, and even expelled from 
school? ___ 
3. Are the students serious about their cause or are they doing it just for fun? ___ 
4. If the university president is soft on students this time, will it lead to more  
disorder? ___ 
5. Will the public blame all students for the actions of a few demonstrators? ___ 
6. Are the authorities to blame by giving in to the greed of the multinational oil 
companies? ___ 
7. Why should a few people like the Presidents and business leaders have more power 
than ordinary people? ___ 
8. Does this student demonstration bring about more or less good in the long run to all 
people? ___ 




10. Shouldn't the authorities be respected by students? ___ 
11. Is taking over a building consistent with principles of justice? ___ 
12. Isn't it everyone's duty to obey the law, whether one likes it or not? ___ 
 
 
Now that you have rated these items, please rank them below from most important to 
fourth most important in making a decision about what the students should do. 
 
_____ # of Most important item _____ # of Third most important item 
  






















































Self Description Scale  
(i.e., Moral Identity Scale) 
 












The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else.  For a 
moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics.  
Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act.  When you have a clear image of 
what this person would be like answer the following questions using the scale below.   
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
              Strongly      Disagree    Neither Agree     Agree       Strongly    
              Disagree      Nor Disagree            Agree 
 
_____ 1.   It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.   
 
_____ 2.   Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am.   
 
_____ 3.   I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics.   
 
_____ 4.   Having these characteristics is not really important to me.   
 
_____ 5.   I strongly desire to have these characteristics.   
 
_____ 6.   I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics.   
 
_____ 7.   The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as 
having these characteristics.    
 
_____ 8.   The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these 
characteristics.   
 
_____ 9.   The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my 
membership in certain organizations. 
   
_____ 10.  I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have 




































Universal Orientation Scale 
 
Directions:  Using the scale below, indicate to what extent each of the following 

















1     2     3     4     5 1.  The similarities between males and females are greater than 
the differences.   
1     2     3     4     5 2.  I tend to value similarities over differences when I meet 
someone.  
1     2     3     4     5 3.  At one level of thinking we are all of a kind.   
1     2     3     4     5 4.  I can understand almost anyone because I’m a little like 
everyone.   
1     2     3     4     5 5.  Little differences among people mean a lot.   
1     2     3     4     5 6.  I can see myself fitting into many groups.   
1     2     3     4     5 7.  There is potential for good and evil in all of us.   
1     2     3     4     5 8.  When I look into the eyes of others I see myself. 
1     2     3     4     5 9.  I could never get accustomed to living in another country. 
1     2     3     4     5 10. When I first meet someone I tend to notice differences 
between myself and the other person. 
1     2     3     4     5 11. “Between” describes my position with regard to groups 
better than does “in” and “out.” 
1     2     3     4     5 12. The same spirit dwells in everyone. 
1     2     3     4     5 13. Older persons are very different than I am.  
1     2     3     4     5 14. I can tell a great deal about a person by knowing their 
gender.   
1     2     3     4     5 15. There is a certain beauty in everyone. 
1     2     3     4     5 16. I can tell a great deal about a person by knowing their age.  
1     2     3     4     5 17. Men and women will never totally understand each other 
because of their inborn differences.  
1     2     3     4     5 18. Everyone in the world is very much alike because in the end 
we all die.  
1     2     3     4     5 19. I have difficulty relating to persons who are much younger 
than I.  
1     2     3     4     5 20. When I meet someone I tend to notice similarities between 



































Social Dominance Orientation Scale 
Which of the following objects or statements do you have a positive or negative feeling 
towards? Beside each object or statement place a number from ‘1’ to ‘7’ which represents 
the degree of your positive or negative feeling.  
1 (Very negative), 2 (Negative), 3 (Slightly negative), 4 (Neither positive or negative), 5 
(Slightly positive), 6 (Positive), 7 (Very positive)  
1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. ___ 
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against  
other groups. ___ 
3. It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. ___ 
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. ___ 
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. ___ 
6. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the 
bottom. ___ 
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place. ___ 
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. ___ 
9. It would be good if groups could be equal. ___ 
10. Group equality should be our ideal. ___ 
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life. ___ 
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. ___ 
13. Increased social equality. ___ 
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. ___ 
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. ___ 































Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale 
This survey is part of an investigation of general public opinion concerning a variety of 
social issues. You will probably find that you agree with some of the statements, and 
disagree with others, to varying extents. Please indicate your reaction to each of the 
statements by recording a number beside each statement, according to the following 
scale: 
-4 if you very strongly disagree  with the statement 
-3 if you strongly disagree with the statement 
-2 if you moderately disagree with the statement 
-1 if you slightly disagree with the statement 
 0 if you feel neutral about the statement 
+1 if you slightly agree with the statement 
+2 if you moderately agree with the statement 
+3 if you strongly agree with the statement 
+4 if you very strongly agree with the statement 
You may find that you sometimes have different reactions to different parts of the 
statement. For example, you might very strongly disagree (“-4”) with one idea in a 
statement, but slightly agree (“+1”) with another idea in the same item. When this 
happens, please combine your reactions, and write down how you feel “on balance” (that 
is, a “-3” in this example). 
___ 1. The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the 
radicals 
and protestors are usually just “loud mouths” showing off their ignorance. 
___ 2. Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married. 





the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us. 
___ 4. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else. 
___ 5. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government 
and 
religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create 
doubt in people’s minds 
___ 6. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no 
doubt every 
bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. 
___ 7. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our 
traditional 
values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad 
ideas. 
___ 8. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. 
___ 9. Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, 
even if this 
upsets many people. 
___ 10. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating 
away at 
our moral fiber and traditional beliefs. 
___ 11. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual 
preferences, even if 
it makes them different from everyone else. 
___ 12. The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way 
to live. 
___ 13. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by 
protesting 
for women’s abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer. 
___ 14. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, 
and take 
us back to our true path. 
___ 15. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our 
government, 
criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way things are supposed to be done.” 
___ 16. God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed 
before it is 
too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished. 
___ 17. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to 
ruin it for 
their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action. 
___ 18. A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women 
are 
submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past. 
___ 19. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the 
authorities 




___ 20. There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way. 
___ 21. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy 
“traditional 
family values. 
___ 22. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would 
just shut up 


















































Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
Mark the following items from 0 (Does not describe me very well) to 4 (Describes me 
very well). 
1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might  
happen to me. ___  
2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. ___ 
3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. ___ 
4. Sometimes I don't feel sorry for other people when they are having problems. ___ 
5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. ___ 
6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. ___ 
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely 
caught up in it. ___ 
8. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. ___ 
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective  
toward them. ___ 
10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation. ___ 
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from 
their perspective. ___ 
12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me. ___ 
13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. ___ 
14. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. ___ 
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other 




16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters. ___ 
17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. ___ 
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for 
them. ___ 
19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. ___ 
20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. ___ 
21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. ___ 
22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. ___ 
23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading 
character. ___ 
24. I tend to lose control during emergencies. ___ 
25. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. ___ 
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the 
events in the story were happening to me. ___ 
27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. ___ 
28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in  




































Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding version 6 
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how 
much you agree with it. 
1-----------2----------3-----------4----------5----------6----------7 
NOT TRUE SOMEWHAT TRUE VERY TRUE 
_____ 1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right. 
_____ 2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. 
_____ 3. I don’t care to know what other people really think of me. 
_____ 4. I have not always been honest with myself. 
_____ 5. I always know why I like things. 
_____ 6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking. 
_____ 7. Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion. 
_____ 8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit. 
_____ 9. I am fully in control of my own fate. 
_____ 10. It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. 
_____ 11. I never regret my decisions. 
_____ 12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon enough. 
_____ 13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference. 
_____ 14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me. 
_____ 15. I am a completely rational person. 
_____ 16. I rarely appreciate criticism. 
_____ 17. I am very confident of my judgments. 
_____ 18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. 
_____ 19. It’s all right with me if some people happen to dislike me. 
_____ 20. I don’t always know the reasons why I do the things I do. 
_____ 21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 
_____ 22. I never cover up my mistakes. 
_____ 23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
_____ 24. I never swear. 
_____ 25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
_____ 26. I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught. 
_____ 27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. 
_____ 28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
_____ 29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her. 
_____ 30. I always declare everything at customs. 
_____ 31. When I was young I sometimes stole things. 
_____ 32. I have never dropped litter on the street. 
_____ 33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit. 
_____ 34. I never read sexy books or magazines. 
_____ 35. I have done things that I don’t tell other people about. 
_____ 36. I never take things that don’t belong to me. 
_____ 37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick. 
_____ 38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it. 
_____ 39. I have some pretty awful habits. 























































Attitude Toward Blacks Scale 
Using the scale below, indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. Place the corresponding number beside the statement. 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Disagree 
3 Slightly disagree 
4 Undecided 
5 Slightly agree 
6 Agree 
7 Strongly agree 
1. If a black were put in charge of me, I would not mind taking advice and direction from 
him or her. ___ 
2. If I had a chance to introduce black visitors to my friends and neighbors, I would be 
pleased to do so. ___ 
3. I would rather not have blacks live in the same apartment building I live in. ___ 
4. I would probably feel somewhat self-conscious dancing with a black in a public  
place. ___ 
5. I would not mind it at all if a black family with about the same income and education 
as me moved in next door. ___ 
6. I think that black people look more similar to each other than white people do. ___ 
7. Interracial marriage should be discouraged to avoid the “who-am-I?” confusion which 
the children feel. ___ 




9. I favor open housing laws that allow more racial integration of neighborhoods. ___ 
10. I would not bother me if my new roommate was black. ___ 
11. It is likely that blacks will bring violence to neighborhoods when they move in. ___ 
12. I enjoy a funny racial joke, even if some people might find it offensive. ___ 
13. The federal government should take decisive steps to override the injustices blacks 
suffer at the hands of local authorities. ___ 
14. Black and white people are inherently equal. ___ 
15. Black people are demanding too much too fast in their push for equal rights. ___ 
16. Whites should support blacks in their struggle against discrimination and  
segregation. ___ 
17. Generally, blacks are not as smart as whites. ___ 
18. I worry that in the next few years I may be denied my application for a job or a 
promotion because of preferential treatment given to minority group members. ___ 
19. Racial integration (of schools, businesses, residences, etc.) has benefitted both whites 
and blacks. ___ 
























































INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
 
Project Title: Addressing the Relationships Among Aspects of Self and Social Attitudes 
 
Investigator: Bryan Hall 
          Psychology Department     502-460-0595     bryan.hall@wku.edu 
         W. Pitt Derryberry, Ph.D.  
         Psychology Department     270-745-5250     pitt.derryberry@wku.edu 
 
You are being asked to participate in a project conducted through Western Kentucky 
University. The University requires that you give your signed agreement to participate in 
this project. 
The investigator will explain to you in detail the purpose of the project, the procedures to 
be used, and the potential benefits and possible risks of participation.  You may ask 
him/her any questions you have to help you understand the project.  A basic explanation 
of the project is written below.  Please read this explanation and discuss with the 
researcher any questions you may have. If you then decide to participate in the project, 
please sign on the last page of this form in the presence of the person who explained the 
project to you.  You should be given a copy of this form to keep. 
 
1. Nature and Purpose of the Project: The purpose of this research project is to 
address the relationships among various constructs of self and social attitudes.  
2. Explanation of Procedures:  Participation in this study involves completing 12 
questionnaires. If you decide to participate in this study, you will complete the 10 
questionnaires on-line after submitting this document. After you complete the first 
10 questionnaires you will schedule a session to complete the remaining two 
questionnaires questionnaires. The questionnaires to be completed ask 
participants to report demographic information, information about their thoughts 
about various social dilemmas and situations, attitudes, and aspects of self. In the 
laboratory participants will complete a categorization task on a computer in which 
you will categorize pictures and adjectives according to a set of rules. Your 
participation in this study will take around 90 to 120 minutes. 
3. Discomfort and Risks: There is minimal or no risk to you in participating in this 
study. This study involves some self disclosure, and a commitment of your time is 
also involved.   
4. Benefits: Your participation in this research will contribute to psychological 
research by helping to better understand how individuals differ on self-constructs 
and attitudes.    
5. Confidentiality: Answers and information obtained in this study will remain 
anonymous and confidential and will be used solely for the purposes of this study. 
Additionally, answers and information obtained will not be identifiable as your 
specific answers. If you should become uncomfortable at any time, you have the 
right to discontinue your participation, and your answers will be removed from 
the study. You have the option to refuse to answer any question and remain in the 




6. Refusal/Withdrawal:  Refusal to participate in this study will have no effect on 
any future services you may be entitled to from the University.  Anyone who 
agrees to participate in this study is free to withdraw from the study at any time 
with no penalty. 
 
If you have read and understand the parameters of this study and wish to participate, 
please read the statement that follows and then click the submit button below:  
  
I understand that it is not possible to identify all potential risks in an experimental 
procedure, and I believe that reasonable safeguards have been taken to minimize both the 
known and potential but unknown risks. 
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